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Fertility in Sub-Saharan African Countries with 
Consideration to Health and Poverty
*
 
Fertility has begun to fall in Sub-Saharan Africa but it remains high on average and 
particularly for a few countries. This paper examines African fertility using a panel data set of 
47 Sub-Saharan countries between 1962 and 2003. Fixed and random country effect 
estimates are made in models where the explanatory variables are suggested by the theory 
of the demographic transition as modified by Caldwell. Special attention is paid to the 
economic status of women, urbanization, the poverty level, and the health of the population 
including total health expenditures and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. The results support 
Caldwell’s hypothesis and are generally supportive of hypothesis that a fertility transition is 
occurring. HIV/AIDS is found to have a negative impact on fertility. 
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While birth rates have fallen dramatically throughout much of Asia and Latin 
America, they have remained high in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Sub-Saharan Africa is a 
region for which the demographic transition has not been well underway.  Fertility, 
however, is not uniformly high and has fallen on average from a total fertility rate (TFR) 
of 6.54 in 1962 to 5.02 in 2002.  The precursors of the demographic transition are 
increased prosperity, an improved status of women, a higher level and growth rate of 
urbanization, improved health services and lower infant mortality.  Since many African 
countries still remain in a relatively high level of fertility, they offer a good opportunity 
to early transitional fertility and, to a lesser extent, pre-transitional fertility. 
We will examine the impact of poverty, health, and female labor force 
participation on fertility. We will also examine the relationship between infant mortality 
and fertility in Africa. In transition theory, a declining death rate is thought to eventually 
lead to a lower fertility rate. In the Sub-Saharan African countries, there has been a 
dramatic increase in death rates due to HIV/AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus), 
which is not true in other countries. Thus, we will examine whether this increase has lead 
to higher fertility. Countervailing factors such as campaigns for lower birth rates by the 
government and by nonprofit organizations and international organizations such as the 
World Bank may have played a role in lowering fertility. Also, the use of systematic 
family planning programs was executed in this area.  
In this paper, we explore the impact of socioeconomic and policy-oriented 
variables on fertility, with a panel data set of 47 Sub-Saharan countries between the 
period of 1962 and 2003.
1 Sub-Saharan Africa is an important region to study in part 
because it has lagged behind other region both in terms of economic development and in 
terms of completing the demographic transition. There has been an abundance of 
empirics on African fertility using cross-sectional regional data or using cross-sectional 
survey data.
2 There have, however, been almost no empirical studies we know of using 
country data through time.  One reason for the absence these time series models of 
African fertility is the lack of regular series of data for key variables. This study will 
                                                 
1 The data are from the World Development Indicators, 2005. 
2 See Schultz (1997). 
  1overcome these data limitations by using both pooled and panel data methods to test key 
hypotheses about fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Special attention is paid to infant mortality, the economic status of women, 
urbanization (both level and growth rate), poverty, and the health status of the population 
including total health expenditure and the prevalence of HIV. Section 2 gives a brief 
discussion of the theory of the demographic transition and how it has been modified by 
Caldwell (1982) to fit the experiences of African countries. Section 3 provides an 
overview of the empirical literature on the transition in the Sub-Saharan African 
economies over time and discussions on specific countries. Section 4 describes the data 
set and our models for fertility in African economies. Then, we discuss the empirical 
findings and the missing data problem which is regarded as a key issue to solve. Section 
5 summarizes our conclusions and the policy implications of our findings. 
 
2. Demographic Transition Theory for Sub-Saharan Africa 
  Much of the research on fertility in less developed countries is based on the theory 
of the demographic transition.  Transition theory is based on functionalism (see Parsons, 
1937), where individual behavior is viewed as satisfying group needs through group 
enforcement of social norms and mores.  In this theory (see Notestein, 1949) prior to 
modernization or economic development,  mortality was high and in order for a society to 
be viable, social norms and mores evolved to encourage high fertility.  With the onset of 
economic development, mortality fell but fertility remained high because social norms 
and mores had not adjusted to the new reality.  Eventually, however, social norms and 
mores may adjust to society’s new needs.  If so, fertility falls to replacement levels.   
  Numerous social institutions and customs are thought to have arisen to support 
high fertility. The theory postulates that with development, these institutions and customs 
will change causing fertility to fall.  Particular attention is placed on children as a 
production input for family enterprise and as a source of retirement support.   
Urbanization, and rising economic opportunities for women have also been emphasized.   
  Early evidence for transition theory was based on the experience of European 
countries in the early stages of industrialization, but it has had to be revised given the 
  2experience of developing countries.  For example, Dyson and Murphy (1985) point out 
that fertility rates have often risen with modernization instead of remaining stagnant and 
high as transition theory predicts.  Caldwell (1982) develops a revised transition theory 
for Africa based on this observation that fertility initially rises with modernization.  His 
theory is explicitly based on the African experience.   
Caldwell bases his revision on the role of the extended family in Africa in 
providing various types of security and his introduction of the concept of wealth 
transfers.  Wealth transfers occur among extended family members in times of economic 
need.  Old age pensions, stressed in standard transition theory may only be a small part of 
these transfers.  When one family member faces economic hardship due to crop failure, 
job loss or other periodic hardships, family members offer financial assistance.  Hence, 
these wealth transfers substitute for the social insurance and social security programs 
present in developed countries.   
Caldwell explains the initial rise in fertility observed by Dyson and Murphy in 
terms of these transfers.  If all family members grow the same crop in the same region, 
they may not be able to help each other in times of economic hardship.  However, if they 
have different occupations, grow different crops, live in different regions, and so forth, 
the likelihood that they will all face economic hardship at the same time is reduced.  They 
are, in a sense, reducing and sharing risk by increasing the number of different income 
sources for the family as a whole.  Caldwell contends that modernization allowed 
families to diversify this occupational mix and, hence, to reduce risk.   
When modernization began in Africa, the expansion of the modern sector allowed 
extended families to reduce risk because young adults could be employed in the modern 
sector in a wide variety of occupations.  Incomes in this modern sector are not likely to be 
highly correlated with incomes in traditional agriculture and the expansion of the modern 
sector presents opportunities for large families to reduce risk as long as there are wealth 
transfers within the extended family.  Hence, the expansion of the modern sector creates 
an incentive for having a larger family because larger families can reduce risk by taking 
modern sector employment and by choosing a more diverse number of careers. 
Therefore, it might be expected that fertility would initially rise with modernization. 
  3This increase in fertility will be temporary because the strength of the bonds tying 
members of an extended family together will begin to weaken.  These bonds will weaken 
with time and distance.  Many of the modern sector jobs will be in urban areas, which 
may be some distance for the homestead and may have a different cultural environment. 
The bonds may be strong after moving, but eventually they will start to weaken.  As a 
consequence, fertility in Caldwell’s theory will begin to fall. 
Due to data limitations, a direct empirical test of Caldwell’s wealth-transfer 
hypothesis may not be possible. Nonetheless, we can test some of its implications. The 
flow of immigrants into urban areas may represent the diversification of occupations.  In 
Caldwell’s hypothesis this diversification is an incentive for having more children.   
Hence the rate of growth of the urban population should be positively related to fertility if 
Caldwell’s hypothesis holds.  However, recent migrants to the city may only be a small 
percentage of the urban population.  Hence, the stock of urban dwellers will largely 
consist of past migrants and second generation urbanites both of whom have weakened 
extended family ties.  Hence, the normal influences of urban life such as an increased 
cost of child rearing are felt by the parents.  These effects will be stronger than the 
diversification effect.  Thus the percentage of the population that is urban may be 
negatively related to fertility while the growth rate of the urban population may be 
positively related to fertility.  Hence, these two variables will be included in the empirical 
model along with other selected socioeconomic variables based in part on the experience 
of sub-Saharan Africa to obtain an empirical description of fertility in sub-Saharan Africa. 
These signs of these two urban variables will provide an indirect test of Caldwell’s 
hypothesis.  We will now briefly discuss this experience. 
 
3. Fertility Patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa is an important region to study partly because its fertility has 
been and remains extremely high.  If the region is to prosper, it would appear that fertility 
must eventually fall.  Hence, the question of whether economic development will lead to 
a fertility transition is important.  Another reason for studying Sub-Saharan Africa 
concerns the high rates of HIV/AIDS for many countries in the region.  HIV/AIDS 
threatens to dramatically alter the course of population growth in the region.  It is an open 
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transition.  
In 1962 virtually all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had a reported total fertility 
rate above 6.0 with an average of 6.54.  The most notable exception was Gabon at 4.06.  
Eleven countries had total fertility rates above or equal to 7.0 with Kenya reporting a total 
fertility rate of 8.12, which is one of the highest total fertility rates ever reported for a 
country.  Fertility has fallen but remains high with an average total fertility rate of 5.02.  
This decline opens up the possibility that fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa is responding to 
economic change.   
  The decline in African fertility, however, is uneven.  Some countries like 
Botswana have seen considerable decline.  From 1962 to 2003 the total fertility rate fell 
in Botswana from 6.90 to 3.74, in Mauritius from 5.72 to 1.97, and in South Africa from 
6.51 to 2.80.  These countries have witnessed considerable socioeconomic change.   
Hence, a high fertility rate is associated with stagnant economies.  Fertility in Angola, 
Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Niger 
and Somalia, has remained at its previously high levels or, in a few cases, have actually 
risen.  
As noted earlier, studies of fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa have almost 
exclusively been cross-sectional studies of a single country studies using either regional 
data or microeconomic survey data.  An exception is Kalemli-Ozcan (2006) which looks 
at the impact of HIV/AIDS on fertility within the region for pooled data and finds that the 
incidence of AIDS in 1985 is positively related to subsequent fertility.  Before seeing if 
these results hold in our model, we will briefly discuss the results from selected studies 
using micro survey data for Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.  While these studies do 
capture microeconomic aspects of transition theory, they can not directly test transition 
theory, which is explicitly a theory of macroeconomic behavior.   
Dow et al (1994) and Robinson (1992) examine surveys for Kenya.  Based on a 
comparison of a fertility survey conducted in 1977-78 with a survey conducted in 1989, 
Robinson concludes that contraceptive use rates have risen from 12.4% to 27% and that 
fertility has fallen as a consequence.  He attributes this fertility decline to changing 
attitudes about family size and family planning.  Dow et al examine the impact of 
  5intergenerational transfers of wealth on fertility and conclude that the declining strength 
of wealth transfer relations between 1981 and 1992 is at least partially responsible for a 
decline in fertility.  Hence, both studies support Caldwell’s revision of transition theory.   
Smith (2004) examines a survey of Nigeria and investigates condom use and 
perceptions of the risks of HIV infection.  He concludes that, while condom use is 
widespread (about 40% of those in his sample), its use is largely determined by social 
norms regarding contraception and fertility and that condom use is not primarily a 
response to fears of AIDS.  Hence, AIDS may not reduce fertility through increased 
contraception.   
Caldwell and Caldwell (1993) and Moulttie and Timaeus (2003) compare several 
fertility surveys and census data for South Africa.  Caldwell and Caldwell argue that the 
demographic transition is well under way in South Africa but they do not conjecture 
about which variables are responsible for the fertility decline.  Moulttie and Timaeus find 
that the fertility rate has fallen to 3.5 births per woman and they attribute much of this 
decline to urbanization and an increased availability of contraception.  They also argue 
that rising HIV/AIDS will further reduce fertility for three reasons.  First, HIV/AIDS will 
increase maternal deaths leading to lower births per woman due to the truncated cohorts 
of women.  Second, HIV/AIDS will lead to secondary sterility of infected women.  Third, 
infected women may choose to avoid childbearing.
3   
In this study, five types of explanatory variables are considered. First, we look at 
two variables directly related to Caldwell’s wealth transfer model. These variables are the 
level (percent urban) and the growth rate of the urban population. As explained 
previously, the level is expected to be negatively related to fertility and the growth rate is 
expected to be positively related to fertility. Second, we look at the relationship between 
mortality, particularly infant mortality, and fertility. A negative relationship is expected. 
Third, we look at women’s labor force participation. A negative relationship with fertility 
is expected. Fourth, we look at income and fertility, again expecting a negative 
relationship. Finally, we look at health related variables and fertility. 
Before considering the empirical analysis, we will briefly discuss the health 
related variables including the infant mortality rate, and the AIDS infection rate.  Several 
                                                 
3 For further discussion of HIV/AIDS and fertility in Africa see Crook (1997). 
  6factors are thought to cause the infant mortality rate to fall in demographic transition 
theory. They include industrialization, urbanization, improvements in living standards, 
literacy, and improvements in medical practices. The decline in infant mortality is 
thought to be followed by a fertility decline. There is no consensus on the causality 
between infant mortality and fertility, as shown by Chowdhury (1988)
4, who infers that 
most of the existing literature uses cross-sectional data with visual data inspection. 
Instead, he performs Granger-causality tests with annual time series for each of the thirty-
five developing countries, reporting the lack of consistent results across different 
countries with only weak support for transition theory, in general.
5
We will examine the impact of infant mortality on fertility for a panel of sub-
Saharan African countries along with other health related variables.  A health related 
variable that is increasing in importance to Africa is AIDS. African countries have seen a 
dramatic increase in deaths due to AIDS.  The impact of this threat on fertility is unclear.  
In part HIV/AIDS increases mortality and could eventually increase infant mortality due 
to increased difficulties in providing health care and sustenance to infants resulting from 
these deaths.  Therefore, we can model fertility rates with three related variables.  These 
variables are a health variable, HIV/AIDS and the infant mortality rate (which is high in 
some African countries). The question is how each of these variables will impact birth 
rates. We will examine these themes because of their potential importance for fertility 
and policy. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis with missing value problem 
The data are provided by the World Bank in World Development Indicators 2005.  
Tables 1-2 give some aggregate statistics for variables used in the models.  Demographic 
                                                 
4 Both demographic transition theory and choice theory indicate that the causality of infant mortality to 
fertility is due to reducing the necessity of preservation and raising the cost of surviving children. The 
Ricardian theory suggests the opposite effect, indicating that causality is from high birth rates to infant 
mortality. And lastly, the modern economic theory on population shows interdependence between these 
variables. 
5 The data set that Chowdhury (1988) uses includes 10 Sub-Saharan African countries – Ethiopia Ghana, 
Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zaire, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria. 2 countries (Ethiopia and 
Sudan) show the Granger-causality of fertility on infant mortality, one country (Tanzania) indicates the 
other direction, five countries indicate interdependence (Ghana, Zaire, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Nigeria – 
the last three are middle-income countries) supporting the modern economic theory on population, and two 
countries (Kenya and Somalia) show no causality. 
  7variables are shown in Table 1 while policy variables are shown in Table 2.  Tables 3 and 
4 give aggregate statistics for these same variables by year.  In the Sub-Saharan region 
data for 48 countries are available. The data for Mayotte are not available for these 
variables. Thus, we provided the summary statistics for 47 countries in Tables 1-4. 
However, when the regression is run, there are 41 countries in the basic model, and 40 
countries remain in the extended model. The data are pooled by accumulating the 42 year 
dataset between 1962 and 2003. Although more annual data are used (one year to 42 
years), the data observations used in the regression only increases from 41 to 91 in the 
basic model settings. However, the results are quite similar. This increases slightly due to 
interpolating missing values of the fertility rate. Thus, we interpolate the total fertility 
rate by fitting linear polynomials. That is, when two observations   and   are known 
but values between two are missing, we fill in those missing values by 








− ⎛⎞ =+ × ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 with 1,2,..., 1 kh = − . Interpolation for missing values are made 
mostly in the 6 years: 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002, and 2003, when other independent 
variables are available. After the interpolation, the numbers of observations used in the 
regressions almost doubles, but the results remain almost identical. When the basic model 
is run with the interpolated fertility rate, the number of observations becomes 204 and its 
results are similar to that of original fertility data. Furthermore, the extended model 
includes 198 observations, where the percentage of the urban population is additionally 
significant.  
Table 5 shows the results for the first set of regressions.  Two models are 
estimated.  The first model is called the basic model, where fertility is estimated as a 
function of the infant mortality rate and per capita GDP.  The second model, the extended 
model, includes the variables in the basic model but adds the percent of the population 
that is urban, the growth rate of the urban population, and the female labor force 
participation rate.  These models are estimated for a selected year and for the pooled data 
set.  First, a cross-sectional estimate is shown for the year 1990.  1990 was chosen 
because for total fertility, infant mortality and GDP per capita are mostly available in 
1990 (confirmed from Tables 3-4).  The results of the basic model hold when it is 
extended to include the additional variables so we will only discuss the extended models. 
  8Three independent variables are significant with both the normal and robust standard 
errors. That is, as the infant mortality rate falls, the total fertility rate falls. Similarly, 
when GDP per capita increases, the total fertility rate decreases. Both these results are 
predicted by most versions of transition theory.  Finally, the growth rate of the urban 
population increases fertility as Caldwell contends.  The percentage of the urban 
population and female labor participation are not significant. The insignificance of female 
labor participation seems unique in Sub-Saharan African countries, since other regions 
including European countries (Jeon and Shields (2005)) and Asian countries (Jeon, 
Shields and Rhyu (2007)) indicate that it has a negative significance. Strong support by 
extended families may make it easier for an African woman to raise a large family while 
she is employed in the market.  The results are similar for the pooled resulted and the 
results with interpolated data.  Furthermore, the regressions provide R
2 and adjusted R
2 
ranges of 0.617 and 0.795, which indicates a reasonably good fit.  
Table 6 provides a robust check for the dependent variable. Table 5 is based on 
the total fertility rate, and Table 6 is calculated from the crude birth rate. Both tables 
provide similar results with the same number of observations. Thus, it is claimed that our 
results are robust to the different definitions of the birth rates. The only differences are on 
the insignificant urban population variable, and on the female participation variable that 
is significant under normal standard errors, but insignificant under heteroscedastic robust 
standard errors.   
Due to the data availability of the infant mortality variable, the number of 
observations in running regressions was restricted. That is, the infant mortality variable is 
available exclusively in 1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2003.
6 Two panel model 
specifications are estimated (shown in Table 7), the fixed effects and the random effects 
models, both of which are selected by the Hausman test which hypothesizes that the 
unobserved individual-level effects are modeled by random effects estimation. That is, 
the fixed effects model is selected for the basic model setting, but the random effects 
model is chosen for the extended model specification. In both model settings with 
country fixed effects, GDP per capita becomes insignificant since the impact of GDP on 
                                                 
6 However, this limited data structure can be fully analyzed with the panel data structure. Since the data on 
1970 are limited, they are dropped. It is worth noting that year 2003 is the last available year in our data set. 
  9fertility is correlated with the country-specific fixed effect. However, the infant mortality 
variable remains positively significant in both specifications. In the extended model 
under the random effects estimation, female labor participation is not significant, which 
confirms the results in Table 5 and Table 6. But, both urban population percentage and 
growth rate are jointly statistically significant. In other words, the level of urban 
population is negatively significant while its growth rate is positively significant on the 
dependent variable. In summary, the panel analysis in Table 7 confirms our findings in 
pooled estimations in Tables 5 and 6, except for two cases, the correlation of GDP and 
country fixed effects, and joint significance of both the level and growth rate of urban 
population.     
Table 8 explores several policy questions, starting from the social structure 
framework containing the total fertility rate modeling. Pooled estimate are shown.  The 
benchmark model is adopted from the basic fertility model with the interpolated fertility 
rate between 1962 and 2003 in Table 5. This benchmark model includes 204 observations 
with a model fit of 0.621 in R
2. The dependent variable, total fertility rate per women, is 
defined as the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to 
the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with prevailing age-
specific fertility rates. Among the independent variables, the “infant mortality rate” is the 
number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given 
year. The GDP per capita is in constant (year 2000) U.S. dollars of gross domestic 
product divided by midyear population. We experiment with several different policy 
models by adding a policy variable group one at a time, since the data limitation does not 
allow us to build the complete model. 
  First, we added two additional variables, the female adult mortality rate and the 
male adult mortality rate. These variables were added as a robustness check to the 
standard assumption that it is only infant mortality that affects fertility. The adult 
mortality rate is the probability of dying between the ages of 15 and 60 subject to current 
age-specific mortality rates between ages 15 and 60. Table 8 indicates that none of them 
are statistically significant. 
  Second, total prevalence of HIV is added, where the prevalence of HIV refers to 
the percentage of people aged 15 and 49 who are infected with HIV. This variable is 
  10available only in years 2001 and 2003, thus it is assumed that the data for 2000 is the 
same with that of 2001. This HIV variable is statistically significant; however, a higher 
percentage of HIV leads to a lower total fertility rate. This result supports the conclusions 
of Smith (2004) and Moulttie and Timaeus (2002) and contradicts the finding of Kalemli-
Ozcan (2006).  Hence, parents react differently to HIV than to other sources of mortality. 
While mortality in general is positively associated with fertility, HIV and its resulting 
mortality is not offset by higher fertility. Therefore, this could mean that HIV could result 
in depopulation because of the absence of any countervailing rise in births. HIV might 
result in lower fertility in part because it decreases the likelihood that parents will live 
long enough to enjoy the benefits of having children. 
  Third, total health expenditure is added as a percentage of GDP. This variable 
covers the provision of health services (preventive and curative) such as, family planning 
activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health but not regarding 
the provision for water and sanitation. No adjustment for missing values is attempted and 
this variable is not statistically significant at the 5% significance level. As another 
modeling strategy, two health variables are added together in the regression. Still the 
same results are applied, the HIV variable is statistically significant but the health 
expenditure variable is insignificant.  
  Fourth, the poverty headcount ratio at PPP $1 per day, as the percentage of 
population, is added in our benchmark model (Model 5). Population below PPP $1 a day 
is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.08 a day at 1993 international 
prices. As a robust check, the poverty headcount ratio at PPP $2 per day is added (Model 
6) which represents the percentage of the population living on less than $2.15 a day. Due 
to the data limitation, we make an assumption that if the data in a specific year is missing, 
it can be filled in with an adjacent year within 2 years. For example, if the data are 
missing for year 1990, then we check the data for year 1991. If the data for year 1991 are 
still missing, we consider the data availability for year 1989.  If these data are also 
missing, we try again with year 1992 and year 1988 and so forth. We apply this missing 
value adjustment only for the years, 1980, 1990, 1995, and 2000. The results indicate that 
both poverty variables are statistically significant. Hence, while higher income may 
  11reduce fertility the distribution of that income is important.  Countries with lower rates of 




While fertility remains high in Sub-Saharan Africa, it has been falling for many 
countries. Some questions we have addressed regarding African fertility are as follows: Is 
there evidence to support Caldwell’s African transition theory? How do income and the 
poverty rate affect African fertility? How do infant mortality and health affect African 
fertility? Does the economic status of women affect African fertility? And has the recent 
threat of HIV affected African fertility? Despite severe data limitations, there appears to 
be credible answers to these questions. 
We find support for several propositions of transition theory as revised by 
Caldwell. First, the level of urbanization is negatively related to fertility as expected in 
transition theory. Second, expansion in the level of urbanization is positively related to 
fertility. This supports Caldwell’s hypothesis that an increase in the size of the modern 
sector will increase fertility. Third, infant mortality rates are negatively related to fertility 
supporting what is perhaps the signature assumption of transition theory. 
Another implication of transition theory concerns the impact of development on 
income. Higher income is thought to eventually lead to lower fertility. We discovered a 
more complicated relationship. While there is some evidence to support this negative 
income/fertility relationship, the distribution of income may also be important. Poverty is 
positively related to fertility, and thus a rise in per capita income will have its strongest 
negative impact on fertility if the improvement is widespread reducing the proportion of 
the population in poverty. 
Finally, female participation in the labor market does not seem to be important in 
explaining fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa. This result is surprising given the presumed 
endogeneity of this variable. Typically women are assumed to leave the labor market in 
order to have children. The heavy reliance of African families on home production might 
  12explain the insignificance of female labor force participation in relation to African 
fertility.
7  
The most important health variable is the prevalence of HIV. Health expenditures 
are not significant while the prevalence of HIV is negative and statistically significant. 
This result indicates that policy to prevent AIDS may be working. Higher rates of 
infection may lead to greater condom use which reduces fertility.  
                                                 
7 In addition, the impact of tribal conflicts on fertility within the country is viewed as a human security 
issue, which is in our research agenda. 
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  15Table 1: Summary Statistics for demographic variables across regions 
 
 number  total  crude  infant  GDP  urban urban female  mortality  mortality 
country  of fertility  fertility  mortality per  population population labor rate rate 
 countries  (interpolated)  (interpolated) rate  capita  percentage growth 
t
participation female  male 
Total 47  6.08  43.65  104.79  2088  42.71  5.44 25.49  396.52  471.58 
Central 5  6.47  45.19  115.60  1110.35 46.78 4.94  22.87  444.05  531.07 
East 8  6.06  43.04  88.29  887.56  43.45  5.54  20.27  391.19  466.69 
Southern 13  5.69  41.70  91.42  3336.02 42.04  5.69  25.27  394.26 464.01 





Table 2: Summary Statistics for policy variables across regions 
 
  number  total  crude  prevalence of  health  poverty headcount  poverty headcount 
  of countries  fertility  fertility  HIV (15-49)  expenditure  ratio at $1 a day  ratio at $2 a day 
Total 47  5.95  43.09  8.93  5.04  42.35  71.69 
Central  5 6.39  44.72  6.80  3.65  53.39  84.92 
East  8 5.90  42.48  4.99  4.91  47.82  77.50 
Southern  13 5.51  41.00  19.78  5.61  36.62  63.51 







  16Table 3: Summary Statistics for demographic variables over years 1962-2003 
 total  crude  infant GDP  urban  urban  female mortality  mortality 
 fertility fertility  mortality per population  population  labor  rate rate 
year (interpolated)  (interpolated)  rate capita  percentage  growth  rate participation  female  male 
1962  6.54  47.76    42.67  6.46  14.18    
1963  6.55  47.72    42.67  6.23  14.60    
1964  6.55  47.61    42.66  6.04  15.03    
1965  6.55  47.46    42.66  5.88  15.46    
1966  6.55  47.38    42.64  6.55  15.93    
1967  6.55  47.18    42.63  6.35  16.41    
1968  6.55  47.15    42.62  6.16  16.89    
1969  6.56  47.01    42.60  5.96  17.37    
1970 6.56  46.96 141.58   42.59  5.75  17.85 412.95  503.43 
1971  6.56  46.89    42.60  6.45  18.41    
1972  6.56  46.82    42.60  6.24  18.96    
1973  6.56  46.68    42.61  6.08  19.52    
1974  6.57  46.26    42.62  5.96  20.07    
1975 6.57  46.11    1912  42.63  5.86  20.63     
1976 6.53  46.02    2000  42.62  6.19  21.22     
1977 6.54  45.85    1935  42.61  6.14  21.81     
1978 6.52  45.75    1886  42.61  6.06  22.41     
1979 6.50  45.49    1887  42.61  5.94  23.00     
1980 6.48  45.35 117.58  2118  42.63  5.84  23.60 376.65  457.96 
1981 6.47  45.13    2068  42.64  5.80  24.21     
1982 6.47  44.83    2014  42.65  5.72  24.82     
1983 6.43  44.67    1983  42.66  5.62  25.44     
1984 6.39  44.51    1990  42.66  5.49  26.05     
1985 6.34  44.31    1995  42.67  5.43  26.67     
1986 6.30  44.13    2021  42.67  5.38  27.32     
1987 6.24  43.95    1988  42.68  5.40  27.98     
1988 6.16  43.64    2015  42.68  5.20  28.64     
1989 6.08  43.32    2065  42.68  5.12  29.29     
1990 6.01  43.01 100.83  2020  42.68  5.07  29.95 352.89  427.17 
1991 5.93  42.67    2012  42.70  5.01  30.58     
1992 5.86  42.35    1957  42.72  4.91  31.21     
1993 5.77  41.84    1919  42.74  4.65  31.84     
1994 5.67  41.34    1968  42.76  3.93  32.47     
1995 5.57  40.90  97.47  1985  42.78  4.63  33.10     
1996 5.49  40.50    2056  42.80  4.66  33.74     
1997 5.41  40.04    2111  42.81  5.11  34.37 423.17  480.17 
1998 5.34  39.59    2142  42.82  4.56  35.01     
1999 5.27  39.13    2324  42.84  4.48  35.64     
2000 5.19  38.65  93.96  2445  42.94  4.37  36.28 435.87  497.94 
2001 5.11  38.14    2552  42.94  4.23  36.91     
2002 5.04  37.70    2215  42.93  4.12  37.54 592.50  631.50 
2003 5.02  37.47  92.36  2228  42.92  3.99  38.17     
mean 6.14  44.03  107.30  2,063  42.70  5.45  25.49 432.34  499.69 
 
  17Table 4: Summary Statistics for policy variables over years 1962-2003 
 total  crude  prevalence of  health  poverty headcount  poverty headcount 
 fertility  fertility  HIV (15-49)  expenditure  ratio at $1 a day  ratio at $2 a day 
year mean obs mean obs mean obs mean obs mean  obs  mean  obs 
1962  6.54  43  47.76  43              
1963     40.40  1             
1964     38.90  1             
1965     36.00  1             
1966     36.00  1             
1967  6.55  43  47.18  43              
1968     31.60  1             
1969     27.70  1             
1970     27.50  1             
1971     26.10  1             
1972  6.56  43  46.82  43              
1973     23.00  1             
1974     33.80  3             
1975     32.93  3             
1976  4.50  1  32.93  3             
1977  6.59  44  45.85  45              
1978     32.60  3             
1979     31.13  3             
1980     28.05  2      49.18 1 80.26 1 
1981     26.80  2      32.73 1 82.92 1 
1982  6.47  46  44.83  46              
1983     23.40  2             
1984  2.16  1  23.50  2      35.73 1 84.55 1 
1985  2.02  1  22.75  2      49.51 2 76.11 2 
1986  1.99  1  22.45  2      16.81 2 40.65 2 
1987  6.24  47  43.95  46       33.55 3 64.49 3 
1988  2.14  1  20.10  1      45.45 1 84.46 1 
1989  4.57  2  20.80  1      53.72 3 75.65 3 
1990  5.99  46  43.01  46       33.32 1 75.37 1 
1991  2.30  1  20.70  1      44.18 4 73.60 4 
1992  5.84  46  42.35  47       53.21 6 83.30 6 
1993  3.66  2  20.30  1      39.39  10  66.81  10 
1994  5.55  6  28.55  2      42.37 4 65.43 4 
1995  5.02  8  19.65  2      31.84 8 64.44 8 
1996  3.08  2  19.70  2      59.85 5 85.43 5 
1997  5.41  47  40.04  47       40.90 3 73.74 3 
1998  3.77  2  23.90  3    5.03  47  44.68 5 76.99 5 
1999  3.48  3  17.75  2    4.94  47  67.00 2 89.96 2 
2000  2.04  2  17.80  2    4.96  47  27.82 4 64.66 4 
2001  1.95  2 17.05  2  9.05 38 5.07 47  39.07  2  67.87  2 
2002  5.04 47 37.70 47      5.23 46  10.80  1  38.40  1 
2003  5.02 47 37.47 47 8.81 38             
mean  4.40  30.97  8.93  5.05   40.53    72.15   
 
  18Table 5: Explaining the total fertility rate in Sub-Sahara African countries  
   original fertility data  interpolated fertility 
   1990  1962-2003  1962-2003 
   basic extended basic extended basic extended 
Constant  5.189 3.661 4.295 2.951 3.971 2.901 
    (13.29) (4.69) (14.03) (4.39) (18.69) (6.25) 
    [14.52] [4.30] [16.27] [5.12] [15.56] [6.49] 
Infant  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Mortality rate  (4.40)  (4.69)  (7.00) (7.39)  (11.61) (11.19) 
    [4.34] [4.46] [7.83] [8.77]  [10.16] [11.71] 
GDP per capita  -0.0002  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
    (-4.31) (-3.53) (-5.53) (-3.54) (-5.40) (-3.37) 
   -4.68  [-4.84]  [-6.76]  [-4.04]  [-3.75]  [-2.55] 
Urban  population   -0.004  -0.007  -0.010 
Percentage   (-0.53)  (-1.52)  (-2.93) 
     [-0.55]  [-1.29]  [-2.56] 
Urban  population   0.119  0.226  0.211 
growth  rate   (2.39)  (5.04)  (7.02) 
     [2.06]  [5.31]  [6.28] 
female  labor   0.021  0.011  0.012 
participation   (1.46)  (0.86)  (1.38) 
     [1.67]  [0.97]  [1.48] 
No  of  observation  41 40 91 89  204  198 
R
2 0.729 0.7951  0.7108  0.7917  0.6211  0.7291 
adjusted R
2 0.7151 0.7649 0.7042 0.7792 0.6173 0.722 
Note: Total fertility rate (births per woman), infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births), GDP per capita 
(constant (2000) U.S. dollars), urban population (% of total population), urban population growth (annual 
%), and female labor force (% of total labor force). The values in the parentheses are t-statistics and those 
in the brackets are Huber/White/Sandwich robust t-statistics. 
 
 
  19Table 6: Robust Check – Different definition of fertility: Crude birth rate 
   original fertility data  interpolated fertility
   1990  1962-2003  1962-2003 
   basic extended basic extended basic Extended
constant 32.421  22.796  29.869 19.579 29.452 22.433 
    (16.03) (6.21 (16.24) (-5.57)  (25.51) (8.58) 
   [18.2]  [6.05]  [18.18] [6.86]  [22.51] [9.01] 
infant  0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 
mortality rate  (7.82)  (9.19)  (8.77)  (10.08)  (14.08) (14.06) 
   [8.23]  [9.37]  [10.04] [11.87]  [13.13] [15.40] 
GDP per capita  -0.0007  -0.0004 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0004 
   (-2.43)  (-1.62)  (-4.53) (-2.64)  (-4.67) (-2.97) 
   [-2.55]  [-1.63]  [-4.20] [-2.29]  [-3.35] [-2.35] 
urban  population   -0.018  -0.010  -0.022 
percentage   (-0.52)  (-0.37)  (-1.10) 
     [-0.48]  [-0.31]  [-1.00] 
urban  population  0.832  1.508  1.182 
growth  rate   (3.55)  (5.98)  (6.97) 
     [3.09]  [7.08]  [6.01] 
female  labor   0.118  0.072  0.056 
Participation   (1.70)  (1.06)  (1.15) 
     [2.17]  [1.30]  [1.30] 
no  of  observation  42 41 86 84  203  198 
R
2 0.797 0.872 0.755 0.843 0.674 0.751 
adjusted R
2 0.786 0.853 0.750 0.832 0.671 0.745 
Note: The dependent variable is crude birth rate and the number of live births occurring during the year per 
1,000 people estimated at midyear. See Table 5. 
 
  20Table 7: Explaining total fertility rate in the Panel Data Structure  
 
   Basic  Extended 
    FE  RE FE RE 
Constant    3.585  3.743 
      (13.94)   (5.26) 
      [10.00]   [4.48] 
Infant  0.029  0.023 0.010 0.017 
mortality rate  (8.21)  (10.79) (2.99) (8.28) 
    [6.01]  [7.68] [1.92] [8.34] 
GDP per capita  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
    (-1.03)  (-3.14) (0.91) (-1.04)
    [-0.58]  [-2.00] [1.11] [-0.87]
urban populaton     -0.049 -0.023 
Percentage     (-5.69) (-4.41)
       [-2.62] [-2.45]
urban population     0.154  0.198 
Growth rate     (4.35) (6.72) 
       [3.08] [5.04] 
Female labor     -0.119 -0.0001
Participation     (-2.8)  (-0.00)
       [-2.45] [-0.00]
no of obs  204  204 198 198 
R
2-within  0.304  0.293 0.608 0.557 
R
2-between  0.703  0.741 0.206 0.764 
R
2-oversall  0.591  0.615 0.277 0.708 
Hausman test  9.25  4.00 
p-value 0.010  0.549 
Decision FE  RE 
Note: Due to the data restriction in the panel structure, the interpolated total fertility rate is used in the 
analysis (See Table 5). The values in the parentheses are t-statistics and those in the brackets are 




  21Table 8: Policy modeling with the pooling Data Structure 
 
    benchmark  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant  3.971  4.406 3.762 3.651 3.937 3.777 3.057 
   (18.69)  (9.69)  (12.02) (10.25) (10.26) (9.06)  (4.95) 
    [15.56]  [9.91] [13.4] [9.90]  [10.09] [10.11] [5.69] 
Infant  0.02  0.020 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.016 0.016 
mortality  rate  (11.61)  (7.65) (7.03) (8.60) (6.97) (5.41)  (5.3) 
    [10.16]  [6.41] [7.48] [6.34] [7.52] [5.62] [6.15] 
GDP per capita  -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
    (-5.40)  (-3.80) (-2.47) (-3.94) (-2.35) (-2.82) (-1.89) 
    [-3.75]  [-2.45] [-2.77] [-2.24] [-2.87] [-3.17] [-2.16] 
mortality  rate    -0.004       
Female    (-1.44)       
      [-1.42]       
mortality  rate    0.003       
M a l e     ( 0 . 9 5 )        
      [ 0 . 9 7 ]        
prevalence  of  HIV     -0.023  -0.021    
(15-49)     (-2.71)  (-2.47)    
       [-3.91]  [-3.43]    
health  expenditure      -0.043  -0.036    
         (-1.00)  (-0.79)    
         [-0.84]  [-0.69]    
poverty  headcount        0.013   
ratio at $1 a day            (3.27)   
           [ 3 . 1 7 ]    
poverty  headcount         0.017 
ratio  at  $2  a  day          (2.85) 
            [ 2 . 6 7 ]  
no  of  observation  204  113  73 84 73 49 49 
R
2 0.621  0.5882 0.6718 0.6746 0.6748  0.741  0.7285 
adjusted R
2 0.617  0.5729 0.6576 0.6624 0.6557 0.7237 0.7104 
Note: The dependent variable is the interpolated total fertility rate (births per woman). Of the independent 
variables, data for GDP per capita are in constant 2,000 U.S. dollars, poverty headcount ratio at $1 ($2) per 
day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.08 ($2.15) a day at 1993 international prices.  
  22Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics for demographic variables across countries 
       total  crude  infant  GDP urban  urban female  mortalitymortality
 country  name  region  fertility  fertility  mortality per population population  labor  rate  rate 
       (interpolated) (interpolated) rate  capita percentage growth rate participation female  male 
1 Angola  Southern  6.86  50.14  159.00 2135 46.87  5.43  22.94  424.63 509.98 
2 Benin  West  6.59  46.43  112.50 877  47.99  6.36  28.03  358.63 432.34 
3 Botswana  Southern  5.67  42.50  68.67 4969 49.57  11.14  26.31  473.60 529.06 
4 Burkina  Faso  West  7.04  46.81  124.17 905  49.56  5.50  10.35  403.44 495.33 
5 Burundi  Central  6.64  44.39  118.33 757  49.84  5.86  5.10  475.32 547.17 
6 Cameroon  West  5.91  42.44  99.83 2077 37.33  5.79  33.10  417.04 487.77 
7 Cape  Verde  West  5.84  37.86  39.80 3880 34.94  5.48  34.91  216.81 270.64 
8  Central African Republic  Central  5.47  41.05  121.67  1285 48.01  3.66  34.86  454.44  554.07 
9 Chad  West  6.55  45.16  119.60 904  43.58  5.51  17.70  424.68 511.47 
10 Comoros  Southern  5.79  38.63  92.67  1833 43.48  4.42  24.57  316.04  372.85 
11  Congo, Dem. Rep.  Central  6.51  47.36  132.83  1446 44.42      493.00  571.00 
12 Congo,  Rep.  Central  6.26  44.95  85.67  902  42.37  4.98  46.90  342.80  441.86 
13 Cote  d'Ivoire  West  6.60  46.17  119.50 1876 32.36  5.55  34.88  390.49  462.95 
14 Equatorial  Guinea  West  5.74  42.35  123.83 4089 35.70  3.35  33.27  395.53  487.23 
15 Eritrea  East  6.21  39.09  73.60  816  47.49  4.64  14.39  394.11  463.24 
16 Ethiopia  East  6.23  48.38  130.83  633  42.06  4.88  11.28  426.24  503.98 
17 Gabon  West  4.46  33.88  62.60  6697 44.91  6.14  53.47  367.68  443.95 
18 Gambia,  The  West  6.08  46.26  118.00 1694 44.85  5.66  21.43  434.28  535.40 
19 Ghana  West  5.94  41.25  79.17  1748 50.51  3.68  31.57  326.60  393.20 
20 Guinea  West  5.82  44.87  143.67 1831 47.43  4.73  19.86  475.36  546.43 
21 Guinea-Bissau  West  6.90  48.97  145.40  844  40.14  4.60  20.93  497.56  525.72 
22 Kenya  East  6.78  45.28  76.83  1037 45.98  7.09  19.38  383.76  454.78 
23 Lesotho  Southern  5.29  38.98  87.00  1411 37.65  6.80  16.04  395.34  467.92 
24 Liberia  West  6.64  47.30  160.83    38.78  4.97  35.11  270.33  352.01 
25 Madagascar  Southern  6.27  45.35  95.83  932  44.89  5.31  20.30  306.72  380.76 
26 Malawi  Southern  7.07  52.37  142.33  555  49.96  5.83  9.71  456.48  521.96 
27 Mali  West  6.93  49.83  153.00  758  46.38  4.90  20.54  393.75  485.86 
28 Mauritania  West  6.00  42.86  106.50 1592 45.19  8.16  32.57  378.77  460.24 
29 Mauritius  Southern  2.90  24.11  28.50 7047 26.47  1.95  40.91 157.30  245.80 
30 Mozambique  Southern  6.17  44.64  132.33  699  48.90  7.69  16.31  418.82  514.70 
31 Namibia  Southern  5.64  39.95  61.50  6266 40.92  4.62  23.71  437.60  494.10 
32 Niger  West  7.77  54.99  178.00  939  44.03  6.36  13.52  416.07  540.10 
33 Nigeria  West  6.59  47.29  113.83  867  35.92  5.68  29.68  437.00  514.84 
34 Rwanda  Central  7.45  48.21  119.50 1162 49.28  5.28  4.60  454.72  541.22 
35  Sao Tome and Principe  West  4.77  37.70  75.00      4.95  32.96  226.00  269.00 
36 Senegal  West  6.40  45.09  104.00 1422 42.21  3.83  38.26  426.88  500.32 
37 Seychelles  East  2.93  23.92  14.25      3.95  43.81  184.83  278.70 
38 Sierra  Leone  West  6.33  47.98  179.50  841  35.88  5.03  25.48  521.00  570.00 
39 Somalia  East  7.22  51.48  133.00    43.59  4.22  23.01  446.89  536.12 
40 South  Africa  Southern  4.35  34.15  51.40 10137 35.37  2.83  49.93  462.09  536.38 
41 Sudan  East  5.83  41.48  76.83  1317 27.44  5.71  23.22  418.94  489.33 
42 Swaziland  Southern  5.74  43.02  98.33 3784 34.18  7.49  18.02  394.08 458.51 
43 Tanzania  East  6.35  45.76  108.00  514  49.98  8.00  17.12  420.63  494.15 
44 Togo  West  6.31  43.65  93.83  1707 39.47  5.88  22.87  383.23  458.60 
45 Uganda  East  6.93  48.95  93.00  1010 47.59  5.81  9.95  454.09  513.25 
46 Zambia  Southern  6.43  46.82  101.00  999  44.04  4.80  35.40  484.16  546.87 
47 Zimbabwe  Southern  5.79  41.38  69.83  2600 44.22  5.60  24.31  398.50  453.25 
 mean    6.08  43.65  104.79  2088 42.71  5.44  25.49  396.52 471.58 
  23Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics for policy variables across countries 
      total  crude  prevalence of health  poverty headcount  poverty headcount
  country name  region fertility  fertility    HIV  (15-49) expenditure ratio at $1 a day  ratio at $2 a day 
      mean  obs mean obs mean obs mean  obs mean  obs  mean  obs 
1  Angola  Southern 6.89 11 50.21  11  3.80  2  3.96  5         
2  Benin  West 6.43  12  45.50  11  1.90 2  4.60  5         
3  Botswana  Southern 5.45 11 41.07  11  37.65  2  5.28  5  31.98  2  58.52  2 
4  Burkina Faso  West 6.95  11  46.50  11  3.00 2  4.36  5  53.75  2  83.67  2 
5  Burundi  Central 6.56 11  43.93 11 6.10  2  3.08 5  49.90  2  86.66  2 
6  Cameroon  West 5.73  12  41.61  11  6.95 2  4.62  5  24.78  2  59.84  2 
7  Cape Verde  West 5.37  13  37.12  12     4.84  5         
8  Central African Republic  Central 5.38 11  40.46 11 13.50 2  3.66 5  66.58  1  83.96  1 
9  Chad  West 6.54  11  45.26  11  4.85 2  6.32  5         
10  Comoros  Southern 5.54  9  38.10  7      2.90  5         
11  Congo, Dem. Rep.  Central 6.53 11  47.15 11 4.20  2  3.60 5         
12  Congo, Rep.  Central 6.25 11  44.83 11 5.10  2  2.48 5         
13  Cote d'Ivoire  West 6.36  11  44.95  11  6.85 2  6.24  5  9.87  6  39.56  6 
14  Equatorial Guinea  West 5.71  11  42.20  11     2.46  5         
15  Eritrea  East 6.07  8  39.04  5  2.75  2  4.78  5         
16  Ethiopia  East 6.20  11  47.75  11  4.25  2  5.28  5 28.99  3  79.03  3 
17  Gabon  West 4.45  11  34.08  11  7.50 2  3.96  5         
18  Gambia, The  West 5.95  11  45.20  11  1.20 2  7.02  5  53.69  1  84.04  1 
19  Ghana  West 5.69  12  40.16  11  3.10 2  5.62  5  36.87  5  77.40  5 
20  Guinea  West 5.74  11  44.25  11  3.00 2  5.44  5         
21  Guinea-Bissau  West 6.85  11  48.86  11     5.62  5         
22  Kenya  East 6.51  11  43.71  11  7.35  2  4.92  5 27.63  3  61.51  3 
23  Lesotho  Southern 5.18 11 38.28  11  29.25  2  5.66  5  36.64  3  59.09  3 
24  Liberia  West 6.56  11  46.96  11  5.50 2  3.84  5         
25  Madagascar  Southern 6.16 11 44.75  11  1.50  2  2.10  5  52.77  5  83.09  5 
26  Malawi  Southern 6.90 12 51.47  11  14.25  2  8.88  5  41.66  1  76.13  1 
27  Mali  West 6.87  11  49.74  11  1.80 2  4.38  5  44.38  2  72.98  2 
28  Mauritania  West 5.87  11  42.15  11  0.55 2  2.94  5  37.86  4  73.50  4 
29  Mauritius  Southern 2.44 25 24.11  42      2.86  5         
30  Mozambique  Southern 6.03 12 44.28  11  12.15  2  5.00  5  37.85  1  78.39  1 
31  Namibia  Southern 5.54 11 39.47  11  21.30  2  6.86  5  34.93  1  55.78  1 
32  Niger  West 7.67  12  54.36  11  1.15 2  4.24  5  51.15  2  84.96  2 
33  Nigeria  West 6.49  11  46.62  11  5.45 2  4.90  5  65.05  3  89.00  3 
34  Rwanda  Central 7.24 11  47.23 11 5.10  2  5.42 5  43.70  2  84.14  2 
35  Sao Tome and Principe  West 4.77  6  39.01  13     9.96  5         
36  Senegal  West 6.19  12  43.92  11  0.80 2  4.74  5  33.85  2  68.02  2 
37  Seychelles  East 2.61  11  24.07  25     5.38  5         
38  Sierra Leone  West 6.27  11  47.64  11     3.52  5  57.03  1  74.42  1 
39  Somalia  East 7.20  11  51.35  11     2.65  4         
40  South Africa  Southern 4.16 11 33.22  11  18.25  2  8.60  5  9.00  3  33.50  3 
41  Sudan  East 5.67  11  40.49  11  2.10  2  4.90  5         
42  Swaziland  Southern 5.56 11 42.12  11  38.50  2  6.32  5  8.00  1  22.55  1 
43  Tanzania  East 6.13  13  44.93  11  8.90  2  4.82  5 48.54  1  72.53  1 
44  Togo  West 6.15  12  42.83  11  4.20 2  6.58  5         
45  Uganda  East 6.83  11  48.54  11  4.60  2  6.56  5 86.14  4  96.91  4 
46  Zambia  Southern 6.26 12 45.88  11  16.15  2  5.80  5  68.62  4  88.87  4 
47  Zimbabwe  Southern 5.53 11 40.04  11  24.75  2  8.72  5  44.72  2  79.17  2 
  mean    5.95    43.09   8.93  5.04    42.35    71.69   




Total fertility rate (births per woman) - Total fertility rate represents the number of 
children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing 
years and bear children in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates. 
 
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 people) - Crude birth rate indicates the number of live 





Female adult mortality rate (per 1,000 female adults) - Adult mortality rate is the 
probability of dying between the ages of 15 and 60--that is, the probability of a 15-year-
old dying before reaching age 60, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates 
between ages 15 and 60. 
 
Male adult mortality rate (per 1,000 male adults) - Adult mortality rate is the 
probability of dying between the ages of 15 and 60--that is, the probability of a 15-year-
old dying before reaching age 60, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates 
between ages 15 and 60. 
 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) - Infant mortality rate is the number of 
infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. 
 
GDP per capita (constant 2,000 US$) - GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. Data are in constant U.S. dollars. 
 
Female Labor force (% of total labor force) - Female labor force as a percentage of the 
total show the extent to which women are active in the labor force. Labor force comprises 
all people who meet the International Labour Organization's definition of the 
economically active population. 
 
Urban population (% of total) - Urban population is the share of the total midyear 
population living in areas defined as urban in each country. 
 
Urban population growth (annual %) - Urban population is the midyear population of 
areas defined as urban in each country that is reported to the United Nations. 
 
Poverty headcount ratio at $1 a day (PPP) (% of population) - Population below $1 a 
day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.08 a day at 1993 
international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates cannot 
  25be compared with poverty rates reported previously for individual countries. Data 
showing as 2.0 signifies a poverty rate of less than 2.0 percent. 
 
 
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population) - Population below $2 a 
day is the percentage of the population living on less than $2.15 a day at 1993 
international prices. As a result of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates cannot 
be compared with poverty rates reported previously for individual countries. Data 
showing as 2.0 signifies a poverty rate of less than 2.0 percent. 
 
Total prevalence of HIV (% of population aged 15-49) - Prevalence of HIV (Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus) refers to the percentage of people ages 15-49 who are infected 
with HIV. 
 
Total health expenditure (% of GDP) - Total health expenditure is the sum of public 
and private health expenditure. It covers the provision of health services (preventive and 
curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated 
for health but does not include provision of water and sanitation. 
 
 
 
 
  26